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Ad hoc networks are built on the basis of a communication without infrastructure and major investigations have focused on the
routing and autoconfiguration problems. However, there is a little progress in solving the secure autoconfiguration problems in
mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), which has led to the proliferation of threats given the vulnerabilities of MANETs. It is clear
that ad hoc networks have no centralized mechanism for defense against threats, such as a firewall, an intrusion detection system,
or a proxy. Therefore, it is necessary that the defense of interests of each of the ad hoc components is the responsibility of each
member node. This paper shows the most common threats to ad hoc networks and reviews several proposals that attempt to
minimize some of these threats, showing their protection ability and vulnerabilities in light of the threats that might arise.
1. Introduction
MANET technology is used to immediately provide secure
access between multiple mobile nodes without the need for a
preset communications infrastructure achieving a multihop
architecture. These networks are identified by two basic
principles: routing and autoconfiguration.
While there is already quite a lot of established work
undertaken on routing [1–4] and consequently those related
to secure routing [5–8], there is still a room for continuous
improvements on those which are still under construction,
notably those related to auto-configuration and in particular,
those in connection with secureMANET auto-configuration.
Thus, this paper shows themost important works carried out
concerning the latter.
Insertion of a node to the MANET involves imple-
menting initial configuration mechanisms [9, 10], such
as assigning an available IP address before this node can
participate actively in the network. There are three types of
solutions to carry out this assignment: stateful, stateless or
hybrid.
In stateful solutions, addresses are assigned by the
network; therefore the network should maintain the status
information of addresses that have been assigned and/or
released.
In stateless solutions, the addresses are assigned by the
same node that enters the MANET. This node should run
a test for duplicate address detection (DAD) in order to
determine the uniqueness of the assigned address.
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The hybrid solutions combine aspects of both previous
types of solutions to improve the scalability and reliability of
auto-configuration mechanisms.
All proposals have advantages and disadvantages in terms
of solving the following problems: uniqueness of addresses,
network initialization, node departure, network partitioning
and network merging. However, all lack a mechanism to
ensure the authenticity of the address owner at the time in
which the auto-configuration is carried out. As a result, a
malicious node can spoof any node already set up to hijack
its traffic, preventing other nodes from entering the network,
sending messages with false addresses, causing denial of
service by flooding the network with unsolicited messages
from fake addresses,rejecting the possibility that other nodes
can access the network, or causing the refusal to accept
the insertion of a new node, when the auto-configuration
mechanism requires that all nodes confirm the entry of a new
member to the MANET.
Although studies over the authenticity of the nodes
entering the MANET during auto-configuration have been
minimal, the aim of this paper is to show how they have
presented some solutions to this problem and show some of
its shortcomings from the perspective of the characteristics
to be evaluated for potential threats within the auto-
configuration process.
This piece of work, including the introduction, is
organized into four sections as follows. Section 2 shows
an overview of possible threats that may occur within a
MANET. In Section 3, the highlights of some proposed
solutions to secure MANET auto-configuration are reviewed
and analyzed. Finally, conclusions are presented in Section 4.
2. Threats in Autoconfiguration
In the processes applied during the execution of the
mechanisms of auto-configuration, predictable and reliable
behaviour from the nodes that compose the MANET is
expected, as much from those which enter as from those
already inside. However, this is not always the case, as
malicious nodes can potentially be causing some damage,
such as interference of messages, node impersonation, denial
of service, spoofing, and eavesdropping among others.
In this paper we use the classification proposed by Wang
et al. [11] and Buiati et al. [12] to specify the security threats.
(i) Address Spoofing Threat. A malicious node may
deliberately choose an assigned or a free IP address
for their attack. In the first case, the malicious node
teases any configured node as its victim and hijacks
its traffic, and in the second one, the node assigns
the free IP address to itself to participate in the
network, gathering important information necessary
to execute active attacks, such as denial of service.
(ii) Address Space Exhaustion Threat. A malicious node
can claim as many IP addresses as possible until
exhausting the address space. This node may request
the assignment of addresses to a ghost node (fake
nodes). This way the malicious node could prevent
other nodes from being configured and entering into
the MANET.
(iii) Address Conflict Threat. A malicious node can assign
a duplicate address to a requester from a possible set
of addresses already in use. Thus, it will create, in
the DAD process, a blackhole attack of address reply
messages (AREP) and lead to an address conflict in
the MANET.
(iv) False Address Conflict Threat. A malicious node might
answer in an unscrupulous way, during the DAD
process, using messages AREQ (address request) with
false addresses in messages AREP (address reply)
that cause conflict with the requester node. Since
the victim nodes cannot verify the authenticity of
the proposed address, it would have to give up their
address and find a new one. The malicious node may
change its IP address to execute its attack.
(v) Denial of Service Threat. A malicious node could,
in an autoconfiguration process, act as a requester
and send AREQ messages to multiple initiator nodes
simultaneously. Similarly, a malicious node may send
many fake DAD messages, causing an overload of
traffic.
(vi) Sybil (Multiples Identities) Threat. A node illegally
claims multiple identities (Sybil node). This node can
build a new identity or steal an existing legal node. In
general, a Sybil node could demand or assign itself
many IP addresses.
(vii) Negative Reply Threat. When assigning a new IP
address, the approval of all preconfigured nodes is
required and an attacker can send a negative response
to avoid the entry of the new node.
3. Secure Autoconfiguration
The following are currently the most significant proposals
that include secure IP address auto-configuration. The
operation of each protocol and what threats they are capable
of preventing are explained.
Wang et al. [11] propose a scheme of secure IP address
auto-configuration for MANETs, which binds each IP
address with a public key allowing each node to authenticate
itself into the network and thus prevent spoofing identity and
other attacks. The following are considered as the four main
security threats surrounding MANET auto-configuration:
address spoofing, false address conflict, address space exhaustion
and negative reply threats.
Identity authentication tries to avoid these threats and
this paper proposes to relate every IP address to a public key
by means of a one-way hash operation;therefore the owner
node of a IP address must use the correspondent key public
in order to be authenticated by the network of a unilateral
way.
It initiates from the following assumption: the MANET
is a network with completely private IP addresses. Therefore,
all 32 bits (IPv4) or 131 bits (IPv6) can be used to address
nodes in the MANET.
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In general, in the proposed scheme, node A, which wants
to participate in an existing MANET or start a new one,
must first randomly generate a key pair (one public and one
private) and one secret key. In the second instance, node A
calculates a hash of 32 bits for IPv4 or 131 bits for IPv6.
After calculating the hash value, the node in question
temporarily uses the resulting value as its IP address, starts
a timer, and broadcasts a duplicate address probe (DAP)
message [13] used to check duplicated addresses on the
network.
If a node (node B) configured within the MANET, where
Node A wants to enter, finds that the IP address contained
in the DAP message issued by node A is equal to it, then it
must verify the authenticity of the DAP message. First, node
B must check that the IP is equal to the resulting hash of the
received public key. Secondly, node B verifies the signature
of node A, if it finds that such a signature is correct, then
node B checks if public key of node A is equal to it and finally
verifies the decryption function. If at least one of the last
two checks is not fulfilled, it can be confirmed that there has
been an address spoofing attack and therefore node B sends
an address conflict notice (ACN) message via broadcast and
discards the received DAP message.
Node A, in turn, waits as long as configured in an internal
timer. If it does not receive an ACN message, it assumes that
the IP is not in use and permanently assigns the address. If
instead it receives an ACN message from some node, before
starting the process again, it must verify the authenticity of
the ACN message received and the signature of the node
issuing the ACN. If these checks are correct, node A is safe
that the IP address is assigned to another node andmust start
the procedure to generate a new pair of public/private keys
and secret key; otherwise node A simply discards the ACN
message and thus prevents false address conflict and negative
reply attacks.
It is clear that the proposed methodology in the auto-
configuration process forces a potential attacker to find,
before launching an attack, the public key for which the hash
function result is equal to the IP address of the victim, since
the controls in the nodes include verification of the identity
of the sender node. This process must be applied for each
message sent; however the protocol clearly controls address
conflict, negative reply, and address spoofing attacks but does
not counteract the address exhaustion attack since it does not
have a way to specify which node is given which IP addresses,
allowing one node to repeat the process as often as desired.
This process should be subject to an ACN message which
certifies that the node will repeat the process because of IP
address duplication.
Buiati et al. [12] propose a secure model for auto-
configuration in MANET, based on a distributed and self-
organizing certificate system, and also include intrusion
detection techniques to improve its safety. The proposed
model is built on the protocol DCDP [14] with the improve-
ments proposed by Mohsin and Prakash [15], adopting
a collaborative trust model described as “K-out-of-N.” So
when a new node wants to enter the network, it must
earn the trust of K of the N total nodes in the network
in order to be accepted into it. To this end, nodes are
able to generate certificates with varying degrees of trust.
Thus, a distrusted node in the network cannot attack by
requesting multiple IP addresses to exhaust them or respond
to configuration requests in a malicious manner, as well as
allow the implementation of intrusion detection techniques
[16].
For the security model, an adversary is defined as
any node that produces messages with incorrect auto-
configuration protocol information. It then specifies that an
adversary can attack the network in twoways: request attacks,
where the adversary creates a great number of anomalous
messages requesting auto-configuration services, or server
attack, where the attacker responds maliciously to requests
made by other nodes in the network. In order to avoid these
types of attacks, the authors differentiate between trusted and
distrusted nodes, avoiding the participation of the latter in
the auto-configuration protocol.
Even though there is the possibility that a trusted node is
compromised the ability to detect reliable nodes that begin
to behave abnormally must be implemented as well. This
means that the auto-configuration protocol messages must
be authenticated so that an adversary cannot create messages
on behalf of another node in the network, being capable
of detecting and accusing the adversary nodes. In addition,
this detection and accusation system should be implemented
collaboratively to prevent an adversary of accusing correct
nodes of the network, using the same model “K-out-of-N”
explained above.
Authentication of auto-configuration protocol messages
is performed using digital signatures, which are built based
on digital certificates generated by a distributed certifying
authority. This is where the model “K-out-of-N” is applied
directly, since, even though every one of the nodes can
perform the functions of certifying entity, the entity’s private
key is split between any subset of K nodes in the MANET.
When a new node (one that has not been previously
connected to the network) wants to get a digital certificate
to identify itself to the MANET, it must take a temporary
IP address to request a digital certificate to his 1-hop
neighbours. When the MANET nodes receive this request,
they can issue a partly signed certificate, depending on the
policies established, and send it to the requesting node. After
receiving K different certificates, the new node has the ability
to build a full certificate and begin the auto-configuration
process, discarding the temporary IP. The use of a temporary
IP can cause collision problems if the IP is already in use in
the network, but it is proposed to use a range of dedicated
IPs for this purpose.
The biggest problem in the proposed model is the value
of K. A high K value increases security, but reduces the
availability of the system because members are less likely
to find enough nodes to retrieve the necessary key to the
CA. Conversely, if K is small, the availability of the auto-
configuration service increases, but the system becomesmore
vulnerable to attacks by adversaries.
Cavalli and Orset [17] propose a secure auto-
configuration protocol adapted to the performance of
ad hoc networks, which includes the authentication of the
nodes within the network that they will be participating in.
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In general, it is intended to satisfy the following items with
their secure auto-configuration protocol.
(i) At any time a node must be able to enter or leave the
network quickly. Likewise, the network must be able
to securely and quickly deliver an IP address to a new
node. On the other hand, the abrupt departure of a
node must not cause chaos within the network.
(ii) To avoid duplicate IP address conflicts, the protocol
must ensure that under no circumstances a node
enters the network with its own IP address, but
instead the network must be able to deliver the right
address to join the MANET.
(iii) The protocol should allow each node to check the
veracity of the members of the network to which they
belong.
(iv) The protocol should be extremely careful with denial
of service. For example, it must not allow a malicious
node from monopolizing all IP addresses on the
network.
The protocol, in addition to satisfying the described
requirements above, wants to meet two broad objectives:
the first is to provide a mechanism for IP address auto-
configuration for nodes belonging to an ad hoc mobile net-
work, optimizing resources such as bandwidth and time, and
the second objective is to allow public key exchange between
nodes within the network to ensure the authentication.
The proposed protocol ensures safe IP address auto-
configuration including the management of public keys for
authentication, which allows avoiding the spoofing attack.
However one of its greatest failings is that it neither pro-
vides nor supports merging networks or prevents malicious
behaviour of network participants after these have been
authenticated; among these the denial of service attack is
worth mentioning since, for example, a malicious node can
authenticate n successive times with n different identities in
order to exhaust the available addresses; and another form
of attack is that the malicious node refuses to authenticate
incoming nodes.
According to Hu and Mitchell [18] the problem with
auto-configuration protocols is that their behaviour depends
on the correct behavior of all nodes involved. Three attacks
are then identified. In the first, a malicious node acts
as initiator, assigning duplicate addresses to the requester
and sending address assignment messages for nodes that
do not exist, effectively reducing the number of addresses
available for new valid nodes. The second attack consists of
a node acting as a requester, by sending requests for address
assignment to multiple initiators, collapsing the network due
to broadcast messages generated by the latter in search of a
valid IP address. For the third attack, a malicious node can
respond to all messages generated by an initiator that tries to
find an available IP address, denying access of new nodes to
the network.
The proposed solution involves the selection of a method
to calculate a “trust value” that is just the level of trust from
one node to another, which decreases or increases depending
on whether the behaviour of a node is malicious or not,
respectively. Then, each node must maintain a list of the
levels of trust it has for other nodes. It is possible that
different nodes can have different trust limits, depending on
security policies. In addition, each node must maintain a
blacklist, to which it adds the nodes that do notmeet the trust
limit, in order to ignore all messages sent by them, except to
enable it to recalculate the trust values for these nodes.
When a new node joins the network, it broadcasts a
message looking for neighbours, including its trust limit. The
nodes receiving this message will respond with a message
containing a list of nodes that meet this level of trust, so the
new node is able to choose a reliable initiator node. For this
model to be fulfilled, the number of malicious nodes needs
to be less than the number of normal or valid nodes.
In this way, each time a node receives any information
from another node in the network, either as part of the
initialization of a new node, collision detection or another
process of the auto-configuration protocol, the node first
calculates the trust value for the node that sent the message.
If this value is below the threshold, the node is added to the
black list and a message of suspected malicious node is sent.
The nodes receiving this message will act in the same way as
the first node, and if they find that the node that sent the
message of suspected malicious node has a sufficient trust
level, the trust value will be calculated for the suspected node,
thus ensuring that only reliable nodes are part of the network.
Hu and Mitchell [18] propose a process for calculating the
trust level and mention other methods [19, 20].
In the analysis of the trust model, only nodes that consis-
tently behave maliciously are noted. That is, those malicious
nodes whose only interest is to affect the calculation of trust
values of other nodes are not taken into account and they
remain as a weakness in the proposal. Other weaknesses in
the proposal are caused by the lack of guarantees against Sybil
attacks, where a node uses multiple identities in a fraudulent
manner, and against identity theft attacks.
Taghiloo et al. [21] propose the Virtual Address Space
Mapping protocol (VASM), where nodes are classified into
four categories.
(i) Allocator: maintain the address space. They assign
new addresses to nodes that join the network.
(ii) Initiator: intermediate nodes between the Allocator
and the Requester node that exchange all messages
between them.
(iii) Requester: a new node that needs to get an IP address
in order to join the network.
(iv) Normal: all the other nodes.
According to this protocol, when a new node joins
the ad hoc network, it sends a single hop message called
INITIATOR SEARCH to find an Initiator node. If there is
no response for this message, the node assumes that it is the
only node in the network and begins the network creation
process. If the new node gets more than one answer, it selects
the sender of the first packet that arrives as an Initiator and
sends it an address request. The main task of the Initiator is
to get a new IP address from its Allocator and assign it to the
requesting node.
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In this protocol, each network has at least one Allocator.
Each Allocator contains an address space used to assign
unique addresses to new nodes as added. The method by
which nodes are chosen as an Allocator and how the address
space is assigned are the main tasks of the protocol. Similarly,
to generate a unique IP address, one Allocator can create
another Allocator on the network to balance traffic loads.
Each Allocator has a list of all Allocators defined in the
network.
The security mechanism for auto-configuration [22] is
based on an approach of zero knowledge. This approach only
requires a one-way hash function and a seed value, which
can be generated randomly. The proposal first establishes
a connection between two nodes A and B to exchange
information using a cryptographic function on a one-way
hash function applied on the seed and in conjunction with
a large random number and a secret cryptographic key
known by both nodes. Each of the protagonists of the
communication carries out the cryptographic operation only
the first time and sends the result of the operation and the
random number to the other, thus avoiding a man-in-the-
middle attack.
For subsequent authentications of both nodes, the value
of the seed is increased by one at a time, and the hash
function value is calculated on the original value of the seed
and the new value increased. The value returned by applying
the hash function is sent to the node pair that is being
communicated. A node applies the hash function. If the value
obtained is equal to the value received the first time, the node
is authenticated correctly. For the next communications, the
seed value must be incremented by one and the previously
explained steps are repeated.
Zhou et al. [23] propose a solution in order tomanage the
public key of an incoming node, which must be distributed
while the secure auto-configuration takes place. Otherwise,
a malicious node can impersonate the new node that is
registered or that distributes the public key. The SA-PKD
achieves the goals of the uniqueness of address allocation and
the secure distribution of public key.
It is assumed that the work environment is a densely
connected MANET with multiple paths between nodes. If
there are malicious nodes in the path between the new node
and each of the members, the proposed scheme uses multi-
hop broadcast to distribute the information encrypted and
signed. Each node checks the forwarded packets to detect the
modification of messages.
When a malicious node is placed between a new node
and a member of the MANET, it is assumed that there is
another good node as a neighbour, and if the malicious node
modifies the control message, this node can move or increase
the transmission power, sending the message again to try to
reach the nodes that lie beyond the malicious one.
If the malicious node deletes the control message, the
good node will interpret that the malicious node has left
the network or moved away. If there is more than one path
between the new node and theMANETmember, themessage
can reach its destination through a different path. If there is a
single path, theMANETmember will not receive themessage
because the malicious one interposes and deletes it. The
proposal uses the HELLO messages in the routing protocols
to help the good node identify the malicious behaviour of
the attacker, allowing it to move or increase the transmission
power to forward the control message.
4. Conclusions
The insertion of new nodes in a MANET during the auto-
configuration process can generate new threats due to the
instabilities in the behaviour of these kinds of networks,
which would create a lack of trust in the transmission of
information through them. The current auto-configuration
protocols, with the presented vulnerabilities, have not
resolved, in their majority, the security problems found
during the insertion of new nodes, creating a necessity for
proposals that include this last component. However, the
research associated to security during auto-configuration of
ad hoc networks is a developing field and still needs much
work. In this work, a few existing proposals in the field of
secure auto-configuration in MANETs are presented, and
they were examined against seven of the most common
threats that can be found on these kind of networks to
determine how secure or vulnerable they are.
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